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income of manufacturing industries, which was higher for
the recent period than for any of the earlier periods, when
current dollars were the standard of value, becomes the
low'est of the figures compared, when correction is made
for changing monetary values.
Recent advances in wage disbursements and in the re-
wards of labor remain substantially above similar gains
during earlier periods of recovery, after full account is
taken of changing living costs. The total purchasing power
of manufacturing labor increased 46 per cent between the
low point of early 1933 and the beginning of 1935.The
nearest approach to this figure, during periods marked by
equal degree of recovery, came in the 1921-22 recovery,
when payrolls, corrected for changes in the cost of living,
advanced 27 per cent.Comparison of the entries for the
last two periods shows that the major part of the recent
gain of 46 per cent came after mid-summer, 1933.Refer-
ence to the measurements relating to average real hourly
wages shows that the active factor in this gain was pro-
vided by a sharp increase in real hourly rates of pay (i.e.
money rates corrected for living Costs).The rise of 19
per cent in these rates, from 1933 to 1935, stands in notable
contrast to the narrower movements of earlier revivals.
If we may measure changes in the purchasing power of
the manufacturer's dollar with reference to changes in the
general level of wholesale prices, and deflate total payrolls
accordingly, we have the corrected wage disbursement fig-
ures given after item (9b) of Table 6.In dollars of con-
stant purchasing power at wholesale the wage bill of manu-
facturing industries shows an advance of 26 per cent over
the period of recovery in 1933-35.This is distinctly higher
than the advances during earlier revivals marked by roughly
equal increases in the volume of manufacturing production.
The explanation is found in. the measurements of changing
labor costs, per unit of product.In terms of the same
constant dollars, these costs dropped 8 per cent from 1933
to 1935, as compared with drops of from 12 to 25 per
cent in earlier recoveries.
Perhaps the most significant comparisons to be made,
among the measurements in Tables 5 and 6, are those re-
latingtothe changes from February-March,1933,to
May-June,1933, and from February-March, 1933,to
December, 1934-January, 1935.The actual degrees of
recovery were nearly the same; the bases from which
changes are measured are identical.It is reasonable to as-
sume that the differences between the two sets of measure-
1935, is to be interpreted with reference to the base from which
the change is measured. At the low point of early 1933 manufac-
tured goods enjoyed a much greater relative advantage than in
any of the three preceding depressions.Reduction of this advan-
tage was the more imperative, therefore, with reference to the
conditions of general recovery.
ments are due to new factors introduced into the operations
of manufacturing industries after June, 1933.The most
important of these new factors were those connected with
the industrial codes.
W.SUMMARY
We may accept the figures presented above as generally
representative of the currents of change that have been
running in recent months and in earlier periods of business
revival, althought we recognize that in detail they would




are suggested by the findings
The advance of the pre-code period, from February-
March, 1933, to June-July, 1933, definitely followed the
pattern of the earlier periods of revival.Primary emphasis
was on production as a means of expanding income, profits
and the returns of labor.Production advanced more rap-
idly than selling prices.Production advanced more rapidly
than the number of persons employed, and productivity per
worker increased.Production advanced more rapidly than
number of man-hours worked, and output per man-hour
increased.Production advanced more rapidly than wage
disbursements, and labor cost per unit of product declined.
Expanding production was a major factor in advancing
gross income.
With respect to the purchasing power of labor, expand-
ing production played a dominant part.Labor costs per
unit of output declined, with rising volume augmenting
the total wage bill.Time rates for labor held practically
constant, during revival; increasing man-hours of employ-
ment operated as the active factor in the expansion of ag-
gregate returns.Total employment (man-hours) rose more
rapidly than did the number of persons employed; hours of
employment per person increased.
Rapidly increasing production and more slowly rising
prices contributed to a sharp advance in gross income.
This meant, although present records do not bear on this
point, immediate increases in profits, in the aggregate.
These were the conditions accompanying a revival of
the traditional type.There is, of course, no reason to ac-
cept the pattern of earlier revivals as a criterion to which
recovery from the depression of 1931-33 must necessarily
conform.This was a graver depression than those we had
known before; it differed in character as well as in degree
from similar periods of economic stagnation in the past.
Moreover, the periods of activity that were launched by
these earlier revivals were marked by important economic
as well as social defects.There is nothing sacred about
the standard defined by these precedents.Yet, in default
of other standards, we must get from them such informa-
tion as we may concerning the operating conditions of this
little-understood industrial machine of ours.NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH, INc. 15
The recovery of 1933-35 is differentiated from earlier
revivals by the reversal of the traditional pattern of revival
that may be dated, it appears, from the general adoption
of industrial codes that began in mid-summer, 1933.Of
course, it is not fair to conclude that the codes alone ac-
counted for all the reversals we have noted.Many cir-
(,(cumstancesaffected the economic changes of these disturbed
months. But it is a just assumption that the new industrial
environment created by the codes had an immediate effect
upon the internal operating conditions defined by the vari-
ous ratios presented in earlier sections.
The outstanding feature of the code period lies in the
apparent reduction of emphasis on production and indus-
trial productivity as a means of swelling gross income and
increasing the aggregate return of labor.Rising prices and
somewhat reduced output marked the code period. As
regards the productivity of manufacturing industries, the
preceding advance (as measured in output per man-hour)
appears to have been checked, although no significant de-
cline occurred during the period of operation under the
codes.Too much weight should not be placed upon this
development, for the factors involved are complex, and the
reasons for changes in productivity are seldom clear.The
sharp preceding increase in productivity per man-hour (20
per cent in four months) probably represented a full reali-
zation of the potential advantages existing at the low point
of the depression. A subsequent check does not provide
definite evidence of technical or organizational weakness,
or of human inefficiency.It is fair to conclude, however,
that the new conditions existing after mid-summer, 1933
did not provide a stimulus to enhanced industrial efficiency.
An increase in the aggregate purchasing power of labor
was one of the objectives of the recovery program, and
such an increase has been very definitely won.Over a
period of some 22 months, while the physical volume of
manufacturing production was increasing 37 per cent, ag
gregate wage disbursements by manufacturing industries,
increased 65percent.'Equal production increases during
the three preceding revivals had brought advances of from
14 to 24 per cent in total wage disbursements.What is
here notable is not the degree of increase, however.The
fact that wage payments had dropped to excessively low
levels in the winter of 1932-33 would lead one to expect
a sharper relative advance, with recovery. The distinctive
features of the recent rise are found in its relations to other
movements of the recovery period.It was an advance ac-
companied by higher costs, per unit of time and per unit
These figures relate to changes between February-March, 1933,
and December, 1934-January, 1935.The percentages of increase
in production and wage disbursements become 49 and 72,re-
pectively, if the records are carried to January-February, 1935.
Since the present figures are given for comparison with move-
ments in earlier revivals, the shorter period is covered.
of output, for the services of manufacturing labor, and
herein it departed most significantly from the traditional
pattern of revival.
Adjustment of these various measurements to take ac-
count of changes in the level of prices and in living costs
alters the general picture somewhat.The rise in selling
prices of manufactured goods in the recent recovery is re-
duced by such adjustment. The increase in the aggregate
purchasing power of manufacturing labor is less pronounced
than the increase in wages in terms of current dollars (the
actual increase in purchasing power amounted to 46 per
ccnt, however),So, also, the measurement of the changes
occurring during the recovery of 1933-35 against a pre-
recession standard changes the perspective, and reduces the
apparent magnitude of some of the recent changes.
But the characteristic features of the recovery of 1933-35
are clearly discernible, no matter what the standard of ref-
erence may be.An apparent check to the advance in in-
dustrial productivity, after mid-summer, 1933, a reduction
of working hours and an exceptionally heavy use of men
to maintain a given volume of physical output, a relatively
sharp advance in the aggregate purchasing power of labor
and notable advances in labor costs per unit of time and
per unit of product are distinctive of the recent recovery.
High labor costs were, of course, a necessary accompani-
ment of a rapid increase in the time rate of wage payment,
unaccompanied by an equal gain in productivity, and of a
rise in total wage disbursements far exceeding the increase
in physical volume of production.The price of an ex-
pansion in purchasing power, so achieved, was the excep-
tional rise in costs we have noted.
Why did this notable rise in hourly wage rates, in aggre-
gate wage payments, and in labor costs per unit of product
-riot lead to a much sharper rise in the selling prices of man-
ufactured goods than that actually recorded? The prices
of manufactured goods rose less rapidly than the general
price level during the recovery of 1933-35, a fact apparent-
ly inconsistent with the declining productivity and advanc-
ing costs we have noted.1'The answer, I think, is that
"If we take account of the relative movements of the prices of
raw and processed goods over the entire period extending from
February, 1933, to the end of 1934, definite reductions of the
disparities developing during the recession are to be observed
(see Bulletin53, NationalBureau of Economic Research, Decem-
ber 22, 1934).Yet we mis-read the changes of this period if we
fail to note the actual course and timing of these readjustments.
Correction of the disparities existing in February, 1933, called
for a rise in raw material prices, relatively to the prices of man-
ufactured goods.Between February-March, 1933, and June-July,
1933, raw materials rose 22.3 per cent in price, manufactured
goods 9.0 per cent.This was the pre-code period.During the
ten succeedingt months from June-July, 1933, to April-May, 1934,
the prices of raw materials rose 8.5 per cent, the prices of manu-
factured goods 10.0 per cent.' The earlier ameliorative move-16 NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH, INC.
these advancing costs impeded a downward adjustment of
the real prices of manufactured goods, an adjustment im-
peratively necessary if the foundations of a lasting recovery
were to be laid.*During the 43 months of recession from
July, 1929, to February, 1933, the prices of raw materials
fell 49 per cent; the prices of manufactured goods fell 31
per cent.The gain in the real value, that is in the average
per-unit purchasing power, of manufactured goods during
this period was 11 per cent.In default of a permanent
shift in inter-group relations, correction of this excessive
over-valuation of manufactured goods was essential to the
restoration of trade in anything approaching normal vol-
time.Some degree of correction was effected, during the
period of recovery we have reviewed, but a disparity still
existed in the early months of 1935.It was this differen-
tial advantage existing at the low point of recession,' an
advantage that became substantial with an expanding vol-
ume of production, that permitted the payment of higher
labor costs, and even made it possible for profits to expand,
without an exceptional rise in the selling prices of manu-
factured goods.But the persistence of the margin that
permitted higher labor costs to be paid and profits to be
reaped, even though volume of output remained low by
merits were definitely reversed, during this period of operation
under the codes. A new correctional movement took place during
the summer of 1934, a movement clearly attributable to the influ-
ence of the drought on the prices of farm products.From April-
May to August-September, 1934, the prices of raw materials rose
9.6 per cent, the prices of manufactured goods 2.1 per cent. There-
after, to the end of 1934, there was no net change in the prices
of these groups of commodities.
There was, thus, definite improvement in the relative position
of raw materials during the period prior to code enforcement,
and during the summer drought in 1934.When the movements,
of these two periods are removed, we find price changes working
against the downward readjustment of the real per-unit value of
manufactured goods.
DLRECTOR'SCOMMENT:
Other and equally important causes of the failure of these real
prices to fall were: the power to sustain prices and restrict output
exerted by industry through N.R.A. codes and non-legal monopo-
listic devices; the relatively large proportion of overhead in man-
ufacturing costs in heavily mechanized industries; the accounting
habits which tend to recover all existing overhead even on small
volume, thus increasing unit overhead costs; the resistance that
large industries are able tooffer to capital reorganization or
bankruptcy.It cannot be assumed that lower prices would not
have been compatible with the existing wage rates if less efficient
competitors had been eliminated, if prices had been forced down
either by competition or regulation, and larger volume of pro-
duction had resulted.
—Gzoacz SOULE
15The potential advantage resulting from price relations was
rendered much greater by a considerable increase in output per
man-hour during the 43 months of recession.
normal standards, retarded full expansion of. sales and of
output and the restoration of employment in customary
volume. And in so doing it worked to prevent the restora-
tion of a normal volume of wage disbursements.
In following the notable increases in wage disbursements
and in labor costs during the recovery of 1933-35 we should
not overlook the severity of' the preceding declines.If
labor costs be measured in the dollars the manufacturer
receives for his products (i.e. if labor costs be deflated by
an index of the selling prices, at wholesale, ofmanufactured
goods) we find that at the beginning of 1935 these costs
stood about where they did in June, 1929.If labor costs
in manufacturing industries were high in 1935, then, they
were high to the extent that the prices of manufactured
goods as a class were high.In respect of the relation of
labor cost to the selling prices of manufactured goods, the
sharp advance of the period of recovery had done no more
than correct for the severe recession that preceded.For
labor costs per unit of product had fallen 29 per cent, from
June-July, 1929, to February-March, 1933, while the sell-
ing prices of manufactured goods had fallen 31 per cent.
This means that, with only a minor difference, the aggre-
gate wage bill showed a net decline equal to that occurring
in the gross income of manufacturing industries.Wage
liquidation paralleled the general drop in gross income,
during these four years of recession.In this respect, the
recession of 1929-33 stands alone, among recent cyclical
declines.For, traditionally, the decline in wage disburse-
ments lags behind the drop in the gross income of manu-
facturing industries, and labor finds itself, at the bottom
of the depression, getting a larger share of the aggregate
receipts.This was not true of the 1933 situation.
Of course, the difference between time rates of pay and
labor costs per unit of product is to be distinguished, in
this analysis.If time rates of pay remain constant, when
industrial productivity is increasing, this means that labor
as a producer is getting none of the rewards of higher pro-
ductivity.(As a consumer, of course, manufacturing labor
would gain, if the higher productivity were reflected in
lower selling prices.)If labor costs per unit of goods pro-
duced remain constant, when industrial productivity is in-
'The comprehensive biennial records available in Census com-
pilations throw light on these changes, during the 1929-33 reces-
sion,In 1929 total wage disbursements constituted 16.5 per cent
of the gross income of manufacturing industries.By 1931 this
percentage had increased to 17.4.This change is in accord with
past experience.By 1933, however, the percentage had dropped
again to 16.8.Liquidation of wages lagged behind the general
process of liquidation during the first two years of recession,but
thereafter the reduction of wages was speeded up. By 1933 wage
payments constituted only a slightly larger fractional part of the
gross income of manufacturing industries than in 1929.
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creasing, this means that manufacturing labor, as a pro-
ducer,isgetting rewards of higher productivity in the
form of higher pay.If the real selling prices of manufac-
tured goods fail to fall, at such a time, it means that the
benefits of the increased productivity are not being passed
on to consumers generally.(Agents of production other
than labor are almost certain, of course, to gain, also.)
•If we compare early 1935 with June-July, 1929, we find
a notable increase in productivity (probably exceeding 20
per cent per man-hour), practically constant real labor costs
per unit of product, substantially higher real rates of pay,
per hour of work done, and an actual advance in the real
prices at which manufactured goods exchange for other
goods.In place of the reduction of real production costs
and real selling prices that was to be expected in manu-
facturing industries, in view of the substantial increase in
industrial productivity that had occurred between June,
1929, and February, 1935, those costs and prices had ad-
vanced.At a time when the strongest considerations re-
lating to general recovery called for lower selling prices,
these prices were maintained at levels above those prevailing
for commodities in general.
There is some analogy between the situation prevailing
in manufacturing industries from 1933 to 1935 and that
which prevailed from 1922 to 1929 (see Economic Ten-
dencies in the United States, National Bureau of Economic
Research, 1932, Cli. VIII).From 1922 to 1929 profits
and overhead charges were maintained at high levels, and
the selling prices of manufactured goods failed, to dedine,
to a degree commensurate with the increase in industrial
productivity and the fall in labor costs that occurred in that
period.This situation tended to reduce marketings and so
contributed to the unstable situation existing in 1929. The
rise in time rates of pay and in total wage payments in
1933-35, and the failure of overhead and fabricational costs
to reflect the great gain in productivity that had occurred
since 1929, helped to perpetuate excessively high prices of
manufactured goods.(The fabricational costs which thus
remained high were not restricted to labor costs.The fact
that labor costs did no more than parallel changes in selling
prices, when material costs were relatively low indicates
that other fabricational charges, such as overhead costs, re-
mairied on the same high level as labor costs.)The ad-
vance in the prices of these goods, at a time when such
goods were already over-valued, retarded a needed expan-
sion in the volume of sales.During the decade of the
'twenties a high manufacturing differential(profits are
here included with the differential) was a factor in pre-
venting the maintenance of a large volume of production
and sales.From 1933 to 1935 a high manufacturing differ-
ential was a factor in preventing the restoration of a large
volume of production and sales.
We are far from knowing all the conditions essential to
the steady and efficient operation of a modern industrial
economy.But experience during the last ten years seems
to justify one general conclusion.The immediate passing
'or. to consumers of a major part of the benefit of increas-
.ing industrial productivity, in the form of lower prices,
contributes directly to the maintenance of industrial opera-
tions on a high level, and to the raising of the standard of
living of the people at large.Action designed to procure
for special groups the advantages of increasing industrial
productivity, or action tending to decrease industrial pro-
ductivity and advance costs, runs the grave danger of de-
feating its own purpose, through setting barriers to the
maintenance (or the restoration)of the volume of pro-
duction and employment that is essential to the general
welfare.
APPENDIX A
NOTE ON SOURCES OF DATA AND CONSTRUCTION OF INDEXES
Production:Indexnumbers are constructed by the Federal Re-
serve Board from 55 individual series of data representing the
production of about 34 industries and estimated to represent, di-
rectly or indirectly, about SO per cent of the total industrial pro-
duction of the United States.The figures are reduced to a daily
average output and are presented to show the actual production.
No correction for seasonal movements has been made in the index
numbers here employed. The monthly average for 1923-25 is the
base.
Number employed and payrolls:Index numbers are constructed
by the United States Bureau of Labor Statistics.The basic data
are supplied by representative establishments in 90 important
manufacturing industries of the country.For November, 1934,
reports were received from over 25,000 establishments employing
more than 3,550,000 workers, whose weekly earnings were about
70 million dollars during the pay period ending nearest the 15th
50 per cent of the total wage-earners in all manufacturing indus-
tries of the country. The three-year average, 1923-25, equals 100.
4'verage hours worked per week: The index numbers are con-
structed from data compiled by the United States Bureau of Labor
Statistics.The reports come from a smaller number of establish-
ments than are covered in the monthly survey of manufacturing
industries.Not,. allreporting establishments furnish man-hour
information.The figures are presented for only those manufac-
turing industries (78 in number) for which available information
covers at least 20 per cent of all the employees in the industry.
Prices:Index numbers are computed by the National Bureau of
Economic Research from wholesale prices compiled by the United
States Bureau of Labor Statistics.The weighted index for man-
ufactured goods includes 536 price series.The average for the
year 1926 is used as base.For the three earlier' periods, an aver-
of the month. The employment reports received cover more thanage of the index numbers of the wholesale prices of semi-manufac-